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CIT I ZEN S HIP, IDE NT I TY 
AND BELONGING IN 
CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIA 
FETHI MANSOURI 
Within the ongoing debates about identity, nationalism and citizenship, 
the history of Arab and Muslim settlement in Australia has been the 
subject of scant research and analysis. While major studies have exam-
ined the racialised representations of Chinese and Pacific Islander 
migrants in literary and media genres, l no significant study has 
conducted an equivalent analysis of the media representation and dis-
criminatory migration policies towards Arab/Muslim workers in pre-
Federation Australia. It is still little known, for example, that many 
European explorations across the Australian outback were aided con-
siderably by Mghan Muslim camel drivers, of whom there were between 
2000 and 4000 in the late 19th century.2 After Federation and the 
adoption of the White Australia policy in 1901, Mghans found it 
increasingly difficult to find employment and live comfortably in 
Australian society. The Lebanese immigration to Australia, on the other 
hand, began in the 1870s and 1880s, although these early Lebanese 
immigrants identified themselves as Syrians.3 They were classified as 
Asians under the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, and while pass-
ing the test that assessed eligibility for immigration, they were often 
excluded from being able to apply for Australian citizenship. 
As a preview to what was to occur more than a century later, racial 
vilification and open discrimination were practised and justified against 
both the Mghan and Lebanese communities in the name of cultural 
homogeneity and national interest. The Mghan camel drivers were the 
first victims of 'Orientalism'.4 Edward Said defines Orientalism as 'a 
Western style [of discourse] for dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the Orient'. 5 Orientalism, therefore, provides a concep-
tual framework for the West to construct knowledge about the Orient 
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from a position of cultural superiority and political power. Such a tra-
dition, which has its roots in age-old ideas about Muslims and 
Orientals, has surprisingly survived centuries of dominant discourses in 
contemporary Western societies like Australia. 
As early as' the latter parts of the 19th century, Mghan Muslim 
camel drivers were subjected to a major campaign of racial vilification 
because of tensions with Anglo-Australian bullock drivers in western 
Queensland.6 At the same time, other campaigns against Syrian hawk-
ers in the capital cities of the eastern seaboard resonated with wider 
colonial campaigns against the Chinese community. In Melbourne, the 
Leader in particular ran a major public campaign against Indian 
Muslim and Syrian hawkers in 1898, involving allegations of criminal-
ity, di~ease and bullying housewives. As if to confirm these popular 
myths, post-Federation immigration and citizenship legislation intro-
duced restrictions that reduced the Muslim population of Australia to 
insignificant numbers. The racial vilification and internment of enemy 
migrants during World War I saw Lebanese and Syrians categorised as 
'Turkish subjects' and, thus, singled out as disloyal and a potential risk 
to Australian society. 
The numbers of Muslim immigrants did not recover until after 
World War II when, initially, the largest group of Muslims to migrate 
were Turkish Muslims. However, in more recent times, since the adop-
tion of a multicultural policy and owing to overseas conflict, Arab 
immigration has increased.7 Amid this recent Arab immigration, there 
have been a diversity of religious beliefs that, sadly, have not been 
reflected in public and media reductionist discourse in relation to 
Middle Eastern migrant communities. 
MULTICULTURALISM, CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
'Cultural diversity' and 'multiculturalism' are widely used terms whose 
meanings are often contested, particularly in academic circles, but whose 
assumptions are rarely debated in public discourse. Thus, social process-
es in Australia that may appear contradictory are more cognisable if we 
examine the dominant practice and discourse of multiculturalism and its 
place in Australia's history. For example, it may appear contradictory that 
many Australians appear to take pride in the culturally diverse nature of 
the population's mal(eup while supporting a government that has tal(en 
a particularly harsh stance towards Middle Eastern asylum seekers who 
have arrived in Australia in recent years. However, as this chapter shows, 
the ambiguous and sometimes problematic intersection of such fluid 
notions as identity, nationalism, citizenship and multiculturalism can cre-
ate particular instances of exclusionary discourse and practice. This is, in 
fact, not totally unexpected since: 
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one of the most difficult things to comprehend nowadays about 
this society ... [is] the absolute coincidence of multiculturalism 
and racism. Far from being the opposite ends of a pole so that one 
can trade the rise of one against the decline of the other, it seems 
to be absolutely dead central to society that both multiculturalism 
and racism are increasing at one and the same time. 8 ' 
Rarely does differential treatment for minority groups, characteristic of 
democratic multiculturalism, garner support frOln a Inajority of the 
Australian public. This is seen, for example, in the vociferous debates 
about indigenous land rights or economic support directed at particu-
1ar minority groups.9 Yet a liberal discourse of equality and equal 
opportunity (i.e, a 'difference-blind' model of multiculturalism) is 
commonly supported and openly preferred by policy makers, many 
groups within civil society, and the general public. The Labor 
Government under Whitlam officially enacted multiculturalism in 
Australia in 1973. Yet, W 2003 Prime Minister John Howard dismissed 
the very term 'multiculturalism', favouring 'cultural diversity' instead: 
'It's [multiculturalism] not a word I use a lot, but there is no other 
word. I mean I tend to talk about cultural diversity. I tend to talk about 
people's different heritage.'lo 
The official government rhetoric on multiculturalism and ethnic com-
munities is a crucial factor shaping public opinion towards migrant com-
mlmities. This is because official government discourse and policies are 
inherently accorded a high degree of legitimacy and certainty in times of 
insecurity. Yet the concept of public opinion is 'an exceptionally ambigu-
ous and volatile tenu and idea ... [because it is] a construction of gov-
ernments, the media, and of everyday conversation influenced by the 
government and the media'.l1 In this context, tl1e policies of the current 
Australian Government and the largely supportive media coverage have, 
indeed, shaped public attitudes and views towards Muslim and other 
migrant comlnunities. This task was made easier by the fact that the cur-
rent Australian Govermnent promotes a version of Australian multicul-
turalism which, while acknowledging the reality of cultural diversity, 
asserts the dominance and power of an Anglo-Celtic Australian core at the 
heart of the nation, its institutions of power and the Australian identity.12 
Prime Minister Howard appears willing to use the term 'cultural diver-
sity' only descriptively, rather than prescriptively, with little commitment 
to an active development of a polity that engages in a meaningful cross-
cultural discourse. Moreover, Prime Minister Howard's particular use of 
the term 'cultural diversity' and reference to 'cultural heritage' appears to 
denote a relegation of cultural difference to the past, as something that 
must be largely abandoned away from the migrant's homeland or prac-
tised only privately and minilnally if minority cultural groups are to be part 
of an Australian nation. By contrast, however, Howard's Australia has an 
Anglo-Celtic past that needs to be maintained in the present: 
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[W]hatever we say about our diverse background, the Anglo-Celtic cul-
tural influence is still the most dominant because we speak English and 
our institutions are, and they were the institutions that attracted a lot of 
people to this country. We've reached a very comfortable compromise, in 
a way that I don't think people think our historical antecedents are threat-
ened in any way by this, whereas I do think a generation ago some peo-
ple felt that. Some people felt that multiculturalism meant that we had to 
in some way disown our past ... [I]t did sort of sound ... like that. 13 
Current policies and rhetoric, therefore, appear to diminish the inlpor-
tance of cultural identity for people in the present and in their imagin ~ 
ings for the future. The negative, minimal fonn of tolerance and 
recognition of cultural difference that Howard embodies does not 
accord, cultural identity the importance that it requires: 
[nust "being tolerated' would not endow the identity they claim with the 
comforting and healing faculties for which it has been desired. The cog-
nitive frame in which tolerance is granted is totally out of tune with the 
frame in which it is sought and received ... The act of tolerance dimin-
ishes, instead of magnitying, the identity's importance. 14 
The government's rhetoric leaves minority group members in a diffi-
cult position: it does not acknowledge the importance of cultural iden-
tity in providing, amongst other affective and substantive aspects, a 
sense of belonging. It is very difficult for the non-Anglo-Celtic 
Australian to truly feel a sense of belonging in Howard's Australia. 
At this point, it is worth examining the intersection of notions 'of 
identity, nationalism and citizenship in the discourse of dominant polit-
ical elites. The current political leadership appears to have tapped into 
feelings of uncertainty, loss and threat in substantial sections of the 
Australian public, which manifested themselves spectacularly during 
the sudden rise of right-wing Hansonisln. This has resulted in conser-
vative governments putting the breaks on the practice of a pluralist, 
inclusive multiculturalism, which appears to be felt as a threat to a 
cohesive, Anglo-Australian national identity. This conservative backlash 
against multiculturalism is a trend found in many Western nations: 
A second level [of the crisis of modernity J relates to the supposed threat 
to national' culture through imported ethnic cultures. By maintaining 
their languages, folklore, cultural practices and religions, immigrants are 
seen as undermining national culture. Racists who attack vvomen in 
Islamic dress claim to be defending the nation, or even European culture 
- a stereotype which links up with older racist notions on the threat of 
the Other to Christianity or civilization. 15 
A shifting and more amorphous sense of national identity that extends 
citizenship and a sense of belonging to the nation to different peoples 
seems to have created a sense of confusion and insecurity for those 
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Australians who may once have felt confident that they themselves 
embodied concrete values and characteristics that could be termed 
'Australian'. They may have felt a greater sense that they belonged to a 
nation, or an 'imagined community' to use Benedict Anderson's phrase, 
when they believed in a common history, common myths and a common 
culture. Multiculturalism, however, asks them to imagine that they and 
non-Anglo-Australians are all different, with different histories, values, 
cultures, languages and group associations, but that they still 'belong' to 
a common community - the nation. Our sense of national identity as 
multicultural citizens is differentiated, yet shared in its acknowledgment 
of the diversity of citizens. Multiculturalism asks us to iluagine a nation 
of citizens who do not necessarily share a common culture, but all of 
whom are still citizens in the sense of having common rights and duties 
and who have the right to participate in the life and workings of a polit-
ical community. Citizenship, as a bond between citizens, is more chal-
lenging in a multicultural setting for some, who may see only difference 
in the Other and not anything shared with which to establish a bond. 
Notions of nation and citizenship also involve the political com-
munity deciding who is part of the nation and who can be a citizen; 
thus both terms have exclusionary implications. Both 'nation' and 'cit-
izenship' involve definitions in relation to otherness.16 The conserva-
tive brand of multiculturalism supported by many political elites in 
Australia actively preserves the power of a dominant ethnicity to define 
the parameters of difference and safeguard the myths of Australian 
national identity that it has created in its own image. To protect this 
powerful position, the rights of citizenship for minorities in Australia 
do not appear to be progressively expanding - in fact they are severely 
constrained. Social and cultural rights are rarely promoted as a means 
of ensuring access to democratic process and distributive justice. 
Recent onshore asylum seekers, predominantly Middle Eastern and 
Muslim, are practically prevented from ever attempting to claim the 
rights of a permanent citizen. 17 As Howard has said, the exclusionary 
and punitive policies are warranted because 'we [not 'they'] will decide 
who comes into this country and the manner in which they cOlue'. 
MUSLIM ASYLUM SEEKERS AND 
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
The challenges facing Australians of Muslim background to be fully 
integrated into Australian society were made even more difficult fol-
lowing a series of national and international events that resulted in a 
new wave of race politics. Australian Muslims were viewed in the light 
of global politics and its implications for national security. In this 
regard, Murray Edeln1an notes that 'national security [is] a symbol that 
generates fears that other nations might act in a hostile way' ,18 
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Edelman further argues that 'because such anxieties are easily aroused 
and because they can easily be directed against any domestic or foreign 
group that is labeled a threat, worries about national security are con-
stantly evoked' .19 National security can, therefore, be used to legiti-
mate racial and religious misrepresentations against minority groups 
with impunity. The national paranoia that followed national security 
issues such as the 'war on terror' and 'border protection' resulted in a 
discourse of demonisation, misrepresentation, mistrust and exclusion 
aimed at Australians of Muslim and Arabic backgrounds. This discus-
sion focuses on the representation of asylum seekers post-September 
11 and the emergent politicised discourse of identity and the Muslim 
cultural Other. 
The Australian Government's negative representations of asylum 
seekers 'from Middle Eastern countries appeared to reach a climax dur-
ing the so-called 'Tampa) and 'children overboard' incidents, both of 
which occurred shortly before the 2001 election. Both appeared to be 
important in securing the Coalition's re~election. In the Tampa inci-
dent,2° the Norwegian freighter Tampa rescued 433 asylum seekers 
whom the Norwegians had found in a sinking Indonesian ferry. The 
Tampa crew, in response to the wishes of the asylmn seekers and in line 
with maritime conventions, attempted to take them to Australian 
waters. However, on 27 August 2001 the Australian Government 
refused the Tampa entry to Australian waters. Despite this refusal, the 
Tampa reached Australian waters on 29 August but was prevented 
from proceeding any further by the Australian Navy. The government, 
vowing that the asylum seekers would 'never set foot on Australian 
soil', did not allow them to move from this sea-bound position until 
New Zealand, Nauru and Papua New Guinea agreed to process 
them.21 Following this incident, the government made substantial leg-
islative changes to the migration zone of Australia to make it more dif-
ficult for future asylum seekers to reach Australian waters. It has also 
cemented its processing arrangements with Pacific island nations, 
resulting in what has become known as the 'Pacific solution'. 
In the 'children overboard' affair, on 7 October 2001, one month 
before the federal election, Minister for Immigration Philip Ruddock 
claimed on national television that asylum seekers had 'thrown their 
children into the water, with the intention of putting us under 
duress'.22 The government released photographic and video evidence 
that they claimed proved that this incident had taken place. A Senate 
inquiry found that the government had in fact been informed that no 
such incident took place and that the photographic and video evidence 
released was deliberately misleading. 
These two incidents were used by the government as a 'central 
motif' of their 2001 election campaign.23 Both involved the govern-
ment as the representatives of the Australian nation clearly defining an 
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Australian national identity against an Other that was Muslim and pri-
marily Middle Eastern. This Other was first clearly established in the 
Tampa incident, when Middle Eastern Muslim asylum seekers were 
shown as a threat to the Australian nation by the use of words such as 
'floods' and 'waves' of onshore asylum seekers, when in reality the 
numbers of onshore asylum seekers were relatively smal1.24 
The discourses of misrepresentation, exclusion and denigration were 
reinforced throughout 2001-02, when a systematic pattern of govern-
ment misrepresentation sought to portray asylum seekers as serial child-
abusers.25 This was not limited to the 'children overboard' incident. 
Other episodes include the claim made by Liberal Senator George 
Brandis that 'a potential illegal immigrant [had] attempted to strangle a 
child'. A subsequent Senate inquiry found that Navy witness statements 
reportedly relating to this alleged episode did not exist. 26 In the case of 
the lip-sewing protests of Mghan hunger strikers, government respons-
es also involved unfounded accusations of child abuse.27 It was alleged 
that adult detainees had forcibly sewed the lips of children. Separate 
investigations by the South Australian Government and the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, with the co-operation of 
Australian Correctional Management, found no evidence of parents 
encouraging children to engage in acts of self-harm. This too was found 
to be an unsubstantiated allegation, but a pattern or regime of misrep-
resentation was now apparent. Under pressure, or to gain electoral 
mileage out of its tough stance, the government appeared quite willing 
to portray asylum seekers as an irresponsible and aberrant group, hos-
tile to Australian standards of decency and parental responsibility, with 
little regard for their children's well-being or safety. 
As Sharon Pickering argues, media stereotypes portraying asylum 
seekers as a threat to the nation seek to validate a host of increasingly 
repressive state responses. 28 Recently, the systematic attempt to depict 
unauthorised arrivals as 'undeserving' has been paralleled by new tem-
porary protection visa (TPV) regulations in Australia. Under the TPV 
policy, some of the most vulnerable people in the Australian commu-
nity' most of whom are incidentally of Muslim background, live with 
the ongoing fear of being refused a visa extension after three years, 
and are deemed ineligible for English classes, housing assistance and a 
range of settlement assistance measures available to refugees on per-
manent protection visas. Of particular concern, is the fact that TPV 
holders are permanently isolated from their spouses and children. This 
policy of blatant discrimination against TPV holders has resulted in 
considerable levels of anguish and hardship for already traumatised 
asylum seekers. Australia remains the only country in the world 
to provide 'temporary' sanctuary to those who have been recognised 
as genuine refugees under the 1951 United Nations Refugee 
Convention.29 
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These (Muslim) asylum seekers have been further stigmatised by 
Ruddock's 'verbal master stroke' in coining the 'unlawful' tag.3D This 
view of 'illegal intruders' committing premeditated acts of self-harm31 
or harm to their own children has been systematically reinforced by 
politicians, with little serious media scrutiny or debate. The deliberate 
manipulation of language to exclude asylum seekers from any category 
of people with WhOlU one might feel human solidarity demonstrates 
the power of language to demonise and dehumanise the most vulner-
able of human beings: those in desperate need of protection and care. 
The majority support for the government's harsh treatment of asylmTI 
seekers has been built on the twin themes of 'war on terror' and 
national security. In this context, Muslim asylum seekers were por-
trayed ~s a potential risk to Australian society and, therefore, needed to 
be treated with the utmost caution and alertness. 
This is reminiscent of the pre-Federation fear and anxiety about the 
'yellow peril', as captured powerfully in David Walker's 'Anxious 
Nation'.32 In the present situation, the government constructed and 
exaggerated particular representations of cultural difference as 'foreign' 
and threatening to the Australian nation. 33 For example, in referring to 
the parents who supposedly threw their children into the sea from the 
boat, Howard was quoted as saying 'I certainly don't want people like 
that coming to Australia'. 34 The government constructed an image of 
abhorrent parental behaviour framed by cultural practice and inimical to 
Australian values of parental responsibility: 'The "children overboard" 
affair again presented Islalu as an alien culture in which parents were so 
barbaric, so subhuman that they would endanger their children by 
throwing them into the sea to stop the Australian navy from doing its 
"duty".' 35 The government appeared to be deliberately blurring the 
distinctions between Middle Eastern, Muslim and terrorist. In the fear-
ful environment of post-Septeluber 11, government ministers declared 
that one could not rule out that some asylum seekers may be linked to 
global terror networks. 36 In excluding Muslim and Middle Eastern 
asylum seekers from the Australian nation, the government established, 
or built upon, a discourse of Australian nationalism that largely 
excludes Muslim- and Arab-Australians. In fact, 'the facile associative 
logic of racism being what it is, the dehumanising and demeaning claims 
about the asylum seekers ended up attaching themselves to Muslim and 
Arab -Australian in general'. 37 This cemented a hostility and distrust 
V\rithin the Australian nation of those associated with Islam, whether 
they are Muslim Australians, or mistakenly identified with Islam because 
they are of a certain ethnicity, particularly Arab. These images were rein-
forced by shallow media coverage, as a survey of refugee and asylum 
seeker issues in the Sydney Morning Herald and Brisbane Courier Mail 
from the start of 1997 to the end of 1999 illustrates: 
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Press coverage has focused on the deviant problem that asylum seekers 
and refugees represent to the robust Australian nation and the need for 
a strong state to keep out and control the menace. With few exceptions, 
reports on asylum seekers and refugees have not been interested in lis-
tening to the voices of asylum seekers, nor of home country conditions 
or conditions of flight. When alternative views are offered, they are USU-
ally presented as 'human interest' stories rather than 'hard' news. 38 
While Pauline Hansen was scorned for ignorance and racism when she 
suggested in 1996 that 'boat people' should be turned around and 
refugees sent home when their countries 'get better', both Liberal and 
Labor have now been complicit in instituting punitive inhumane 
measures in Australian law. For Chris Sidoti, former hUlnan rights and 
equal opportunity commissioner, such changes signify that 'our lead-
ers, from both Inajor political groupings, are turning us into a nation 
of thugs'. 39 The question, then, is why have these political leaders acted 
in such 'thuggish' ways and why do opinion polls suggest that they are 
acting in ways that are widely supported by the Australian people? One 
of the reasons why Australians have acted so adversely to the arrival of 
asylum seekers is that they have a deep-seated fear of invasion and that 
this has been present since the arrival of the British in 1788.40 Having 
seized the first bit of Australia so easily, it was initially the Dutch and 
the French who were seen as the enemy, and then later the Japanese, 
Germans, Indonesians, Vietnamese and Chinese each took their turn in 
providing the potential threat of invasion. Ironically there has never 
been any real threat of invasion, with the Japanese in 1942 specifically 
rejecting the idea on the basis that it would require too luany person-
nel and that the 'national character' of Australians would mean they 
would 'resist to the end',41 Despite this, there remains in the Australian 
psyche a fear of being overrun by foreign hordes, and the influx of 
asylum seekers is seen as yet another kind of foreign horde. 
The language of demonisation and misinfonnation reached its 
zenith when Mr Howard introduced the 'theln' and 'us' rhetoric into 
the debate, when he stated unequivocally: 'I express my anger at the 
behaviour of those people and I repeat it. I can't comprehend how gen-
uine refugees would throw their children overboard, .. I certainly don't 
want people of that type in Australia, I really don't,.42 This statement 
critical of asylum seekers and casting doubts over their integrity and 
ethics has become the dominant theIne in other statements Inade bv 
"' 
senior government ministers including the then Defence Minister Peter 
Reith, who argued that immigration control had become an important 
security issue and that '[illegal immigration] can be a pipeline for ter-
rorists to come in and llse your country as a staging post for terrorist 
activities' ,43 The danger in llsing such language in media statements and 
other press coverage of the asylUlu seekers crisis is that its divisive 
rhetoric tends to evoke prejudices and emotions that exceed rational 
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interpretations. The deliberate link between national security, global ter-
rorism and the boat people in the above excerpts has constructed strong 
prejudices against asylum seekers, who are increasingly portrayed as dif-
ferent and manipulative Others capable of irrational and despicable 
behaviour such as risking the lives of their children for migration out-
comes. The neat distinctions between the uncivilised, unlawful and dan-
gerous intruders as represented by asylum seekers on the one hand and 
a civilised, ethical and democratic Australia on the other succeeded in 
generating fears and hostility towards this imagined enemy. 
THE PROBLEMATIC STATUS OF ISLAM IN THE WEST 
To understand the current images and representations of Muslim- and 
Arab-Australians, it is important to look for historical parallels as a way 
of unlocking the anomalies of the present.gn fact, like anti-Semitism, 
Islamophobia in Western societies has been fuelled by a history of re-
ligious competition and antagonismJ As Edward Said has pointed out, 
'Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic attitude 
towards Islam' .44 He further explains that: 
Islam was a real provocation in many ways. It lay uneasily close to 
Christianity, it could boast of unrivalled military and political successes. 
Nor was this all. The Islamic lands sit adjacent to and even on top of the 
Biblical lands; moreover, the heart of the Islamic domain has always been 
the region close to Europe, what has been called the Near Orient or Near 
East. Arabic and Hebrew are Semitic languages, and together they dis-
pose and redispose of material that is urgently important to Christianity. 
From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, 
Islam in either its Arab, Ottoman, or North Mrican and Spanish form 
dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. That Islam 
outstripped and outshone Rome cannot have been absent from the mind 
of any European past or present.4S 
Similarly, 'while these stereotypes are born in Europe and increasingly 
in the United States, the media and Hollywood have provided an 
important means of spreading such images in already fertile and well-
disposed environments such as Australia'. 46 Research has shown how 
these images are present in the Australian press and in school text-
books. The report of the National Inquiry into Racist Violence in 
Australia noted that: 
Anti -Arab and Muslim feelings are largely based on stereotypes about 
Arabs and Muslims: a generalized identification of Arabs and Muslims 
with violence (such as terrorism and the taking of hostages), stereotyped 
identification of Arabs and Muslims with 'un-Australian values' (for 
example, religious fundamentalism, conservative views about women 
and moral issues, dietary restrictions, conservative and conspicuous 
clothing ... ).47 
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Many commentators make direct links between recent world and local 
events and defamatory attacks against Muslim- and Arab-Australians. It 
is worth exploring further how these 'new' Australians have come to 
be seen by some to be implicated in events that, in reality, are often far 
beyond their control. This might be understood through the confla-
tion of Muslim and Arab, the lack of understanding of Islam in Western 
cultures and the presentation of Islam as a homogeneous entity that is 
now associated with terrorism. It might also be regarded as part of a 
conservative bacldash against multiculturalism, or at least a conserva-
tive hardening of the notion of multiculturalism, involving a fear and a 
deep suspicion of any Australian with multiple cultural and national 
allegiances, and a fear of visible communities who do not assimilate to 
Anglo norms. Ironically, the isolation that has been almost forced upon 
some members of Muslim- and Arab-Australian communities has been 
interpreted as a rejection of and dissociation with 'Australian-ness', and 
as evidence of loyalty to a religious or political order that is thought to 
be an enemy of the West. 
Muslim and Arab-Australians have not been immune to harass-
ment, prejudice and exclusion from a wider Australian society up to 
this point. The violent and abusive experiences suffered by many 
Muslim- and Arab-Australians appear to have exceeded the voracity of 
negative experiences around the time of the Gulf War. However, 
Muslim - and Arab-Australians faced serious levels of discrimination and 
xenophobia at that earlier point in history, and many relate stories of 
their continued experiences of harassment and xenophobia throughout 
the turbulent 1990s. How, then, are we to understand the existence of 
this xenophobia before September II? 
Western discourse on world events from the 1970s onwards has led 
to a historical association of Islam with 'extremism, intolerance and 
violence' .48 Such events include the Iranian revolution of 1979, the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the Gulf War of 1990-91, and terrorist activities 
undertaken around the world committed in the name of Islam, for 
example in the Middle East, Philippines and Indonesia. ~uch a rela-
tionship between Islam, Arabs, violence and oppression has not been 
constructed simply following September 11) Indeed, 
[aJnti-Arab racism in the West has a long genealogy. One of the most 
important aspects of its formation is that it is intricately related to the 
genealogy of anti-Muslim sentiments. In both the academic orientalist 
tradition analysed by Edward Said, and the dominant popular Western 
racist imaginary the boundaries between being an Arab and being a 
Muslim is greatly blurred. 49 
Certainly such a negative, essentialist and misguided discourse has been 
heightened in the aftermath of the events in New York and 
Washington, but it must be remembered that it is simply a new point 
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on the continuurn of a Western discourse. Writing in 1997, several 
years before September 11, postcolonial theorist Edward Said worried-
1y commented that 'malicious generalizations about Islam have 
become the last acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in 
the West'. 50 Said challenges the 'clash of civilisations' thesis epitomised 
by Western scholar Samuel P Huntington, in which Islam is portrayed 
as a 'single, coherent entity' that is forever inevitably on a path towards 
violent conflict with 'the West' .51 Huntington writes: 
So long as Islam remains Islam (which it will) and the West remains the 
West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two 
great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations 
to the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries. 52 
Said's challenge to this thesis is that sweeping and hostile generalisa-
tions about Islam are Inade by Orientalist scholars, the Western mass 
media and Western policy makers. Through these commentators, Islam 
is denied any diversity in character, practices and beliefs, and all 
Muslims and Arabs are presented as having intrinsic natures that are 
mostly discussed pejoratively. 53 Said writes that this has dangerous con-
sequences for inciting hatred and distrust towards Muslims and those 
associated in the West with Islam: 
The deliberately created associations between Islam and fundamentalism 
ensure that the average reader comes to see Islam and fundamentalism as 
essentially the same thing. Given the tendency to reduce Islam to a hand-
ful of rules, stereotypes, and generalizations about the faith, its founder, 
and all of its people, then the reinforcement of every negative fact asso-
ciated with Islam - its violence, primitiveness, atavism, threatening qual-
ities - is perpetuated. 54 
Thus well before September 11, there existed in the Western imag-
ination an acceptance of an Islamic totality and its association with vio-
lence, oppression and terror. Impacts of recent events on Muslinl- and 
Arab-Australians lnust, therefore, be understood as being fed by a his-
tory of hostility, antagonism and misunderstanding towards Islaln and 
Arabs by many sectiof\s of Western society. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion of recent events shows that Australian Muslims 
have been reduced to the same monolith of pejorative stereotypical 
images of Islam that Said describes. Q\ustralian Muslims have been denied 
their individuality, their cultural diversity as well as their humanity) 
What is constantly ignored by 'Muslim watchers' in Australia is the enor-
mous diversity among Australian Muslims, for everyone is not cut from 
the one cloth: differences in education, socioeconomic background, eth-
nicity, customs and religious outlook play their part ... Stereotypes now 
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define people as less than human and" what a litany there is to choose 
from: veiled women, fierce bearded men, barbaric parents, rapists and 
suicide bombers - these are the images taken to represent Islam. But 
where is the human face that I know? Where are my parents, my broth-
ers and my sister. Where are my friends?55 
While global political events involving Muslims have undoubtedly con-
tributed to much of the anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment in 
Australia, it would be unhelpful to disregard the effect of historical and 
local factors. Negative attitudes towards Muslim- and Arab-Australians 
need, therefore, to be viewed in the light of interrelated factors, includ-
ing media representations, social policies (in the form of a folldoric ver-
sion of llluiticulturalism), as well as the deep, if unconscious, influence 
of 'Orientalist' discourse on perceptions of Islam and the East. In 
Australia, such a situation is further compounded by the current polit-
ical debate about national security and the almost daily 'terror alerts' 
issued by government ministers, self-declared experts and media 
reporters. As Said proposes, the mere use of the term 'Islam' to either 
explain or indiscriminately condemn the diverse Islamic world is an 
irresponsible overgeneralisation that is problematic, counterproductive 
and would be unacceptable if applied to any other cultural or demo-
graphic group. 
This should be all the more unacceptable in the context of a cul-
turally diverse society such as Australia. Instead we are witnessing a 
Hansonite-type of nationalism, reminiscent of pre-Federation argu-
ments for cultural unity. Such cultural unity required for a stable and 
unified population is perceived by conservatives to be undermined by 
multiculturalism and threatened' by different cultural groups, in partic-
ular Muslims and Asians. Within the conservative political thinking 
about multiculturalism and immigration 'the existence of difference 
within a community is strongly coded as disunity, as a pathogen or 
weakness' . 56 It is in this political and social clin1ate that immigrant 
Muslims in Australia, because of their cultural difference and pro-
nounced visibility in a predominantly secular society, have been con-
structed both as a threat to social homogeneity and increasingly as a 
potential risk to national security in the age of the 'war on terror'. 
Social, political and academic debate on identity in Australia continues, 
with a range of responses evident. Some prefer to assert the primacy of 
the Anglo-Celtic cultural core, SOllle perceive multiculturalisf!l as the 
irreversible cultural reality, while others advocate an approach based on 
the notion of civic identity underpinned by citizenship rights. The on-
going discourse on the Australian identity is of course important and 
relevant to Muslim- and Arab-Australians. Like other ethnic groups, 
Muslims would be reassured to see the re-emergence of a more inclu-
sive society that ensures fairness, dignity and honourability for all -
irrespective of race, religion or culture. 
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